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Civil Partnership in Scotland 2004 ± 2014, and Beyond 
Kenneth McK. Norrie, Professor of Law, University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
Exactly ten years separates the passing by the UK Parliament of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, which brought civil partnership to Scotland, and the passing by 
the Scottish Parliament of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, 
which opened marriage to same-sex couples in Scotland; exactly fifteen years 
separates the (re)establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the 
Independence Referendum in 2014.  The political judgment made in 1999 that 
devolution would kill the aspiration to independence stone dead has proved as 
misconceived as the political judgment in 2004 that civil partnership would satisfy 
any demand for same-sex marriage.  The new political structures within the United 
Kingdom established by devolution rendered it inevitable that the development of 
civil partnership would play out very differently in Scotland and in England, but the 
existence of two distinct legal systems, on separate developmental paths, long pre-
dates devolution. 
Scottish family law has always been based on very different perceptions of family life 
from English family law and these differences reflect profound historical, social and 
(particularly) religious dissimilarities between the two nations.  We in Scotland have 
no concept, for example, of parental consent to marriage, revealing a different view 
of both the nature of the parent-child relationship and of marriage (and avoiding the 
difficulties English law will face when parents refuse consent due to non-acceptance 
RI WKHLU FKLOG¶V VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ.  That marriage is a more secular contractual 
relationship in Scotland than it is in England is shown by the facts (i) that marriage 
contracts have always been enforceable in Scotland but are (generally speaking) 
unenforceable in England (Scherpe, 2012), and (ii) that divorce has been available in 
Scotland for three hundred years longer than in England.  The grounds laid down in 
the (English) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 by which a marriage is voidable leaves 
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the Scots lawyer utterly bemused.  The differences in both the rules of annulment 
and of divorce are traced to the very different religious histories of the two countries. 
The Reformation was caused by separate pressures in Scotland and England, and 
led to very different forms of church (and, before the Union and after Devolution, 
state) governance.  Scotland adopted a Presbyterian model for its national church 
(the Church of 6FRWODQG RU ³WKH .LUN´ ZKLFK LV PHPEHUVKLS OHG DQG ZLWKRXW D
hierarchy of vicars, rectors, bishops and the like.  Its more puritan doctrines are 
illustrated well by the fact that divorce ± following the biblical precedents ± was 
accepted in Scotland immediately after the Reformation while the reformed English 
church continued to adhere to Catholic doctrine concerning the sanctity (and 
therefore irreversibility) of marriage.  The flattened, non-hierarchical, structure of the 
Kirk, which is to be compared with the retained Catholic hierarchy within the 
established Church of England, had political as well as legal consequences: the King 
became the Supreme Governor of the Church of England but, like everyone else, a 
mere member of the Church of Scotland.  (Indeed it was the efforts of King Charles I 
to turn himself from member to master of the Church of Scotland that triggered what 
LVXVXDOO\UDWKHURGGO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³(QJOLVK´&LYLO:DUAnd it affected social 
attitudes: the social democracy that is ascendant in present-day Scotland, which has 
resisted the individualism of most of the rest of the UK, has long historical roots. 
Devolution offered the opportunity for Scottish family law to take a very different 
route from that in England, though same-sex relationship recognition has followed a 
similar path, responding to similar social pressures, in the two jurisdictions.  The 28th 
British Social Attitudes Report (National Centre for Social Research, 2010, table 2.6) 
shows a continuous fall in the number of people in the United Kingdom who consider 
same-sex relationships to be always or mostly wrong (48% in Scotland and 46% in 
England in 2000; 40% in both Scotland and England in 2005; and 27% in Scotland 
and 29% in England in 2010), together with a concomitant rise in the number of 
those who consider same-sex relationships to be not wrong at all (29% in Scotland 
and 34% in England in 2000; 35% in Scotland and 37% in England in 2005; and 50% 
in Scotland and 44% in England in 2010).  The Scottish Parliament has been quick 
to respond to this change in social attitudes.  The Scotland Act 1998 itself included 
prevention of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in its definition of 
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³HTXDO RSSRUWXQLWLHV´ DQG RQH RI WKH 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW¶V HDUOLHVt pieces of 
legislation was the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 which contains the first 
explicit statutory inclusion in the United Kingdom of same-sex couples in a provision 
dealing with families.  Since then no legislative provision passed by the Scottish 
Parliament concerning couples has failed to include same-sex couples on the same 
terms.  The civil partnership proposals in 2003-04 were never going to be resisted by 
the Scottish Parliament. 
 
Why Westminster? 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 is, of course, an Act of the UK Parliament at 
Westminster, and it provides three separate civil partnership regimes: one for 
England and Wales, one for Northern Ireland and one for Scotland.  Differences 
between the three parts reflect the existing differences in the marriage laws in these 
three jurisdictions.  Yet civil partnership is a matter that falls clearly within the 
authority of the Scottish Parliament: family law is not one of the areas that the 
Scotland Act 1998 reserved to Westminster.  As such, the first question to ask in 
UHODWLRQ WR 6FRWODQG LV WKLV  :K\ GRHV WKH  $FW FRQWDLQ D ³3DUW  &LYLO
3DUWQHUVKLSLQ6FRWODQG´DWDOO" 
Shortly after the UK Government proposed a system of civil partnership registration 
for same-sex couples in England and Wales (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2003), the Scottish Executive (as the Scottish Government was then known) 
announced that they would seek the agreement of the Scottish Parliament to include 
Scottish provisions in the UK Bill.  A consultation paper was then published (Scottish 
Executive, 2003), in which a number of difficulties were identified that would follow if 
England and Wales introduced civil partnership but Scotland did not: Scottish 
couples who registered their partnership in England would be treated as civil 
partners for reserved matters (including tax, benefits and pensions) but not for 
devolved matters (such as succession, property sharing and dissolution); if Scottish 
civil partnership were substantially different from English civil partnership (for 
example in eligibility to enter such a relationship), some Scottish couples might be 
recognised for devolved but not for reserved matters.  The simplest solution, the 
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consultation paper suggested, was to provide a civil partnership registration scheme 
in Scotland, equivalent to the English system. 
The Scottish Parliament was therefore invited to pass a motion giving its permission 
for the UK Parliament to legislate on a devolved matter.  The official line was that this 
was desirable in order to ensure that the reserved consequences of marriage, such 
as tax and social security, could be extended to civil partnership at the same time as 
the non-reserved consequences, but would also ensure consistency between the 
two jurisdictions (Scottish Executive, 2003, [4.2]-[4.6]).  The same argument might, 
of course, be made in relation to same-sex marriage, which similarly involves a mix 
of both devolved and reserved consequences, but by the time same-sex marriage 
was on the agenda Scotland had elected a Scottish Nationalist Government, and 
there was never any question of that Government using the legislative consent 
motion process for an issue so central to domestic social policy.  One of the inherent 
tensions in the devolutionary settlement is illustrated here: the UK Parliament, 
legislating for England and Wales, does not distinguish between devolved and 
reserved matters and so domestic English debate at Westminster continues to have 
consequences for Scots (and Northern Irish) law. 
One of the explanations for the Scottish Parliament¶V willingness to allow 
Westminster to act on its behalf is that, though in its second four year session by 
2004, the Scottish Parliament was still finding its feet, and the Scottish Executive 
was at that time a coalition government ± comprising the Scottish Labour Party as 
the dominant, and the Scottish Liberal Democrats as the junior, partners.  This 
meant that the Scottish Government at that time had very strong political 
connections to the (Labour) UK Government.  (These connections of course came to 
an end in 2007 when the coalition was replaced by the Scottish Nationalists, and 
even more profoundly in 2010 when the Labour Government was replaced by a UK 
coalition dominated by the Conservative Party, whose support in Scotland shows no 
sign of recovering from its Thatcherite crash). 
But there is a deeper reason beyond these close governmental links which explains 
WKH 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR contemplate Westminster legislating for 
Scotland, a reason that traces its roots (like the Scottish Tory collapse) back to the 
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Thatcher era.  In 1988 the UK Parliament passed the Local Government Act 1988, 
section 28 of which prohibited local authorities throughout the United Kingdom from 
³SURPRWLQJ KRPRVH[XDOLW\ DV D SUHWHQGHG IDPLO\ UHODWLRQVKLS´  %RWK WKH /DERXU
Government in the UK, elected in 1997, and the Labour/Lib-Dem Coalition in 
6FRWODQGHOHFWHGLQYHU\HDUO\LQGLFDWHGWKDW³VHFWLRQ´ZDVWRJRDQGWKLV
was effected in Scotland in 2000,1 three years before the British Parliament 
managed to do so for the rest of the United Kingdom.2  However, notwithstanding 
that the overwhelming number of MSPs from both the coalition Government and the 
SNP opposition favoured repeal, opposition took a surprising and disturbingly extra-
parliamentary form.  A wealthy businessman and Evangelical Christian, Brian 
Soutar, who owns and operates the Stagecoach group of companies, joined forces 
with the Roman Catholic Church and mounted a vicious scare-campaign against the 
repeal of section 28.  Souter funded the so-FDOOHG ³.HHS WKH&ODXVH&DPSDLJQ´ WR
the tune of £1m,3 ZKLFKZDVXVHGWRFRQGXFWDSULYDWH³UHIHUHQGXP´RQWKHPDWWHU
WKRXJK LQ IDFW WKHEDOORWSDSHUFRXOGQ¶WHYHQJHW WKHQDPHRI WKHVWDWXWHULJKW WKDW
they wanted to retain).  Catholic priests instructed their flocks how to vote, and 
posters appeared across Scotland explicitly associating homosexuality with child 
abuse: the narrative presented by the Keep the Clause campaign was that section 
28 was all about protecting children.4  Many opponents to section 28 simply ignored 
WKLV ³UHIHUHQGXP´ EXW LW LV D VREHULQJ WKRXJKW WKDW IURP DQ HOHFWRUDWH RI DURXQG 
PLOOLRQ MXVW RYHU  PLOOLRQ SHRSOH LQ 6FRWODQG ³YRWHG´ WR NHHS VHFWLRQ  RQ WKH
statute book.  To their credit, the Scottish Executive went ahead with its repeal, with 
only the Conservatives (very much a minority party in Scotland) and a handful of 
nationalists voting to retain it. 
The repeal of section 28 did little to voting patterns, and the same (Lib-Lab) coalition 
was re-elected to the Scottish Parliament for its second session in 2003, but there is 
little doubt that the Keep the Clause campaign had made Scottish politicians 
exceptionally nervous about directly challenging what appeared to be powerful 
religious forces, which had shown an ability to disrupt normal political debate.  It was 
against that background that the decision had to be taken when the UK Government 
announced its Civil Partnership Bill for England and Wales (and Northern Ireland) 
whether the Scottish Parliament would take the responsibility that the Scotland Act 
6 
 
1998 had given it in this central family law matter or would allow Westminster to 
legislate on its behalf.  The convenience argument (which is not without merit) won, 
though the suspicion has long remained that the infant Scottish Parliament simply 
did not have the courage to take on the issue, so soon after the bruising section 28 
fight.  In any case the Parliament passed the necessary motion and the UK 
Parliament extended its Civil Partnership Act to Scotland. 
 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 in Scotland 
The policy objective for Scottish civil partnership was the same as for English civil 
partnership: to replicate so far as possible the marriage (and divorce) rules for this 
new legal institution, and the differences between the Scottish and the English parts 
of the Act reflect the fact that the matrimonial laws of the two jurisdictions, as we 
have already seen, have always been substantially different.  This policy objective 
was achieved in the Scottish part by three distinct drafting strategies: (i) replicating in 
the 2004 Act itself those family law statutes concerning the creation and termination 
of the marital relationship; (ii) amending existing legislation that gave legal 
consequences to marriage; and (iii) creating entirely new statutory rules applicable to 
civil partners for those consequences of marriage that continue to be governed by 
the common law.  The most important of the last mentioned is section 131, which 
puts into statutory form for civil partners the ancient common law rule that the 
surviving spouse of a person who dies domiciled in Scotland has an indefeasible 
FODLPWRSDUWRIWKHGHFHDVHG¶VHVWDWH. 
Since the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force, Scotland has not seen the 
litigation experienced in England involving individuals unwilling to accept the moral, 
social and legal equivalence of marriage and civil partnership and the development 
of the law has been driven by subsequent legislation, politically designed to further 
the original objective of making civil partnership as like marriage as possible. 
 
Differences Between Marriage and Civil Partnership 
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Though the UK Act went noticeably further than most other European jurisdictions 
that introduced civil partnership in equiparating the institution with marriage, in 
neither Scotland nor England is civil partnership completely identical to marriage.  In 
Scotland there are two major structural respects (other than the obvious difference in 
gender-mix) in which the two institutions were, until 2014, treated differently: civil 
partnership, unlike marriage, was designed to be an entirely secular institution, and 
an entirely sex-free institution.  Civil partnership for its first ten years could be 
created only by a district registrar and registration was prohibited in religious 
premises (a matter explored more fully below).  The sexual aspects of marriage were 
deliberately excluded too (and indeed remain so, even after the 2014 amendments).  
Adultery, though still a ground for divorce, was not made a ground to dissolve a civil 
partnership ± though all the other grounds for divorce are replicated.  And the only 
ground upon which a marriage in Scotland is voidable and open to retrospective 
annulment ± incurable impotency at the date of the marriage ± was not extended to 
civil partnership.  So while marriage remains even today a relationship with both 
religious overtones and sexual undertones, civil partnership was designed as a 
relationship with legal consequences created by a state official without any religious 
involvement at all, and without any implication of sexual fulfilment.  To many people 
this is an attractive blue-print for the legal regulation of personal relationships in the 
modern age but, as we will see, it is a model followed only to a limited extent as 
marriage has developed. 
There were also a couple of important areas where the decision was made to treat 
civil partnership differently from marriage.  There is some difference in the 
calculation of pensionable service in relation to occupational pension schemes, 
which is an area where the laws of Scotland and England are identical ± and is 
reserved to Westminster (and Scots law on the matter will therefore be reviewed 
under the terms of section 16 of the (English) Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013 rather than the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014).  Other 
than that, the most important difference between marriage and civil partnership in the 
Scottish part of the 2004 Act concerned adoption of children.  The Adoption 
(Scotland) Act 1978 restricted couple-adoption to married couples, as did the 
equivalent English legislation until the Adoption and Children Act 2002 allowed in 
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that jurisdiction joint adoption by any couple, of whatever gender mix, so long as the 
appOLFDQWV DUH ³OLYLQJ DV SDUWQHUV LQ DQ HQGXULQJ IDPLO\ UHODWLRQVKLS´5  This was 
amended in the English part of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 so that spouses or civil 
partners could jointly adopt, as well as couples in an enduring family relationship.  
No equivalent amendments were made to the Scottish adoption legislation, on the 
only partly persuasive ground that Scottish adoption law was at that time under 
review and that the matter of extending capacity to adopt was better dealt with within 
the context of a comprehensive restructuring of adoption law (Scottish Executive, 
2003, [6.40]).  So while civil partners in England and Wales were able to adopt from 
the commencement date of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, civil partners in Scotland 
had to wait until the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 came into effect in 
September 2009. 
 
Errors in the 2004 Act 
The drafting strategy adopted, for all three UK jurisdictions, was to amend each 
individual statute that provides consequences for married couples rather than to 
enact a general DPHQGLQJSURYLVLRQVXFKDV³ZKHUHYHUµVSRXVH¶µKXVEDQG¶µZLIH¶RU
FRJQDWH WHUPV DSSHDU WKH\ VKDOO EH UHDG WR LQFOXGH FLYLO SDUWQHUV´  ,W ZDV DOO EXW
inevitable from that drafting strategy that errors and omissions would be made, 
requiring subsequent amendment. 
By far the most serious error in relation to Scots law was discovered in 2012, by 
which time the 2004 Act had been in force for almost seven years.  For it was not 
noticed until that point that the secondary legislation that allows courts to dispense 
with third party evidence in non-contested divorces6 had not been extended to the 
dissolution of civil partnerships.  This was a problem because courts since civil 
partnership came in had been happily granting dissolutions without such evidence in 
non-contested cases, just as they do in non-contested divorces.  By the time the 
error was discovered, some 145 dissolutions had been granted without third party 
evidence, giving rise to an exceptionally nice legal problem: is a decree granted by a 
court acting beyond its powers completely void, in which case the couples are still 
empartnered (and any subsequent registration or marriage is invalid), or merely 
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voidable, in which case the couple are free until such time as their decree of 
dissolution is reduced?  Emergency legislation was passed,7 but it was not made 
retrospective since the Scottish Government took the view that the decrees were 
merely voidable, and that anyone who had acted on the basis that they were now 
single would EH SHUVRQDOO\ EDUUHG RU ³HVWRSSHG´ LQ WKH (QJOLVK WHUP IURP
challenging their dissolution; in any case the Government felt that it could not use 
secondary legislation to render valid any existing decree that might be invalid, but 
that primary legislation would be necessary.8  Section 27 of the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 backdates the secondary legislation to the date the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into effect, thereby retrospectively validating all 
such potentially invalid decrees.  This is an inelegant solution to a problem that 
inevitably arises when the law has two institutions doing the job of one.  There is an 
important lesson here that will need to be remembered when the decision comes to 
be taken whether to retain civil partnership or to abolish that institution as 
unnecessary now that same-sex couples have the right to marry. 
 
Place of Registration 
The location where marriage ceremonies may take place has never been a big deal 
in Scotland, where the control mechanism has traditionally lain more in who is 
authorised to celebrate the marriage rather than where it can be done.  This can be 
seen by comparing the lengthy provisions in the (English) Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 on the registration of premises with the equally lengthy provisions 
in the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 on the authorisation of 
celebrants.  Questions like the one that troubled the Supreme Court in 2013, whether 
6FLHQWRORJ\ZDVVXIILFLHQWO\D³UHOLJLRQ´WKDWLWVSUHPLVHVFRuld be used for marriage 
ceremonies,9 would not arise in Scotland, where religious marriages have always 
been able to be solemnised anywhere agreed to by the parties and the celebrant.  
Civil marriages could originally be solemnised only in the registration office of the 
relevant local authority, but since 2002 local authorities have been able to approve 
any place as suitable for marriage solemnisation, other than a place associated with 
a religion the doctrines of which would be inconsistent with civil marriage.10 
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The Civil Partnership Act 2004 gave rather greater protection to religious 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVE\SURKLELWLQJWKHXVHRIDQ\³UHOLJLRXVSUHPLVHV´ZKHWKHURUQRWWKH
religion in question adhered to doctrines inconsistent with civil partnership.11  But this 
created an inconsistency between civil marriage in Scotland and civil partnership.  
The response of the Scottish Government was to amend the 2002 Regulations for 
civil marriage and bring in the more restrictive rule applicable to civil partnership.12  It 
is a paradox that legislation designed to liberalise the law of personal relationships 
thus led directly to a reduction rather than an increase in the choices available to 
couples getting married.  And there was a bigger paradox to come, for the English 
provision limiting place of registration of civil partnership was repealed in the Equality 
Act 2010, but the identical Scottish provision was not ± mainly it would seem 
because it was a late amendment from an English peer and then the whole of that 
Act was rushed through just before the dissolution of the Westminster Parliament for 
the 2010 General Election.  The end result was to leave Scotland with a restrictive 
rule, designed to be consistent with English law, but which English law has since 
dropped.  The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 201413 attempts to 
resolve the conundrum by repealing all the rules about local authority authorisation 
of places, for both civil marriage and civil partnership, but maintaining the prohibition 
on either being in a religious place: the effect is to shift the burden from the local 
authority to the district registrar to determine whether a place is religious. 
 
Unregistered Same-Sex Couples 
An ever-increasing gap between Scottish and English family law is found in the way 
that informally cohabiting couples ± cohabitants ± are treated in the two jurisdictions.  
The primary aim of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was, of course, to deal with 
formalised UHODWLRQVKLSVEXWWKH$FW¶VIDLOXUHWRDPHQGWKHODZRIFRKDELWDWLRQ meant 
that same-sex couples continued after the 2004 Act came into force to be treated 
less well than opposite-sex couples who did not formalise their relationship with the 
state.  The interpretative obligation imposed by the House of Lords in Ghaidan v 
Mendoza14 to include same-VH[ FRXSOHV ZLWKLQ WKH FRQFHSW RI ³OLYLQJ WRJHWKHU DV
KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH´ RQO\ SDUWO\ DVVXDJHG WKH SUREOHP EHFDXVH VRPH OHJLVODWLRQ
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remained very gender-specific.  But two years after the Civil Partnership Act 2004, 
the Scottish Parliament passed the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, the major effect 
of which was to create new financial remedies at the termination of cohabitation, 
either by death or by separation.  This goes far beyond what English law has yet 
been able to achieve for cohabitants and, perhaps, reflects a discomfort in Scotland 
with hierarchies of relationships that has not fully evolved in England.  The provisions 
in the 2006 Act were, of course, applied to same-sex as well as opposite-sex 
cohabitants,15 and the 2006 Act also took the opportunity to extend to same-sex 
couples existing cohabitation provisions that had not been so extended by the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004.  Interestingly, and perhaps presaging the ending of civil 
partnership, the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 repeals all 
statutory references to same-sex couples ³OLYLQJ WRJHWKHU DV LI FLYLO SDUWQHUV´ DQG
UHSODFHV WKHP ZLWK UHIHUHQFHV WR ³WZR SHRSOH « OLYLQJ WRJHWKHU DV LI WKH\ ZHUH
PDUULHGWRHDFKRWKHU´16 
 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 
Showing a confidence and maturity that was, perhaps, less evident in 2004, the 
Scottish Parliamentary debates on the Bill that became the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 contain very few references to the equivalent 
English legislation.  No longer was the aim to do as the English were doing, but 
instead was to provide a marriage and civil partnership regime consistent with 
existing Scottish principles.  As in England the main opposition came from religious 
organisations, but that opposition was far less strident than it had been during the 
³VHFWLRQ´GHEDWHV± not least because the most prominent Roman Catholic cleric 
LQ 6FRWODQG &DUGLQDO .HLWK 2¶%ULHQ ZDV IRUFHG WR UHVLJQ LQ HDUO\  GXH WR
allegations of sexual impropriety with other priests.  The final vote in favour of same-
sex marriage (105 to 1817) was substantially greater in Scotland than in England and 
Wales (where at the Third Reading in the House of Commons the Marriage (Same-
Sex Couples) Bill passed with 366 MPs in favour to 161 against).18 
The headline effect of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 is, of 
course, to open marriage to same-sex couples but it also amends marriage law in a 
12 
 
number of interesting and useful ways.  First, the existing common law rule that a 
wife cannot be convicted of ³reset´UHFHLYLQJ stolen goods) if the husband is the thief 
is simply abolished,19 removing from Scots law WKH ODVW YHVWLJH RI D ZLIH¶V GXW\ WR
obey her husband.  Secondly, the rules relating to impotency are limited to marriages 
involving opposite-sex couples,20 with the consequence that there is no ground upon 
which a same-sex marriage will be voidable and open to retrospective annulment.21  
Thirdly, the Registrar General for Scotland is given new powers to ensure that 
religious or belief bodies that seek to provide marriage celebrants meet certain 
prescribed requirements.22  )RXUWKO\WKHFRQFHSWRI³UHOLJLRXVPDUULDJH´LVH[WHQGHG
WR LQFOXGH ³UHOLJLRXV RU EHOLHI´ PDUULDJHV  7KH LQFOXVLRQ RI EHOief marriages (and 
belief civil partnerships) was designed to accommodate humanist ceremonies, 
though it removes what had been a rather pleasing paradox in Scotland that the 
Humanist Society Scotland was prescribed by the Registrar General for Scotland as 
a religious body in order to allow humanist celebrants to solemnise marriages.  (This 
FRXOGQRWKDSSHQLQ(QJODQGIRUKXPDQLVWVKDYHQR³SODFHVRIZRUVKLS´± a matter 
irrelevant in Scotland).  In truth of course, we have always had belief marriages ± we 
call them religious marriages ± and the most logical thing to do (other than require all 
marriages to be civil) would have been to subsume religious marriage into the more 
general category of belief marriages.  Politically, however, this was simply not 
practicable within an Act that was already irritating most mainstream religious bodies 
almost beyond endurance. 
In addition to these changes to marriage law the Scottish legislation ± as its title 
suggests and in sharp distinction from the English legislation ± contains 
comprehensive amendments to civil partnership too.  
 
The religification of civil partnership 
The primary change to civil partnership effected by the 2014 Act was to remove its 
one great saving grace: its immunity from religious involvement.  Originally designed 
as a strictly secular institution, civil partnership could not be registered by anyone 
other than a district registrar, nor at any religious venue.  Now, however, religious 
officials are to be allowed to effect their registration.  In the name of equality with 
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marriage, civil partnership is made equally vulnerable to religious interference.  This 
is madness.  Once we allow religious bodies to effect the creation of our 
relationships, we invite them to tell us how to live our lives, and such bodies are 
unlikely to decline the invitation.  The history of religion is the history of powerful 
bodies of men (and the gender-specificity here is deliberate) taking it upon 
themselves to lay down rules of sexual and familial behaviour ± not only for their own 
followers but for the whole of society. 
The result is that same-sex couples in Scotland will be able to choose one of four 
mechanisms for formalising their relationship in law: (i) religious or belief marriage, 
solemnised by a religious or belief celebrant, (ii) civil marriage, solemnised by a 
district registrar, (iii) religious or belief civil partnership, registered by a religious or 
belief celebrant, or (iv) civil registration of civil partnership, effected by a district 
registrar.  (The limitation of choice for opposite-sex couples to civil or religious/belief 
marriage only is no substantive deprivation and requires no expenditure of 
sympathy). 
 
Conversion of civil partnership to marriage 
It is likely that many of the same-sex couples who have since 2005 registered their 
civil partnership in order to formalise in law their relationship would have preferred to 
marry, had that option been available to them.  The Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014 allows for same-sex couples who are in a civil partnership 
(registered either before or after marriage became available to them) to convert that 
partnership into a marriage.  The Act provides two methods of conversion, neither of 
which involves divorce.  First, there is to be an administrative process the details of 
which will be contained in regulations made by the Scottish Ministers.23  Secondly, 
the civil partners may, quite simply, marry each other: in other words, an exception 
has been created to the otherwise universal rule that a person in a civil partnership is 
ineligible to marry.24  (It may be noted that the equivalent English legislation provides 
only an administrative process for conversion25 ± civil, but not religious, conversion).  
There is, however, no mechanism for converting ³GRZQJUDGLQJ´"a marriage into a 
civil partnership. 
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Accommodating religious opposition 
The debates in the Scottish Parliament were far less strident than the debates in the 
media (or the UK Parliament), perhaps because parliamentary opponents realised 
from an early stage that they would lose the primary argument ± and were more 
realistic in that assessment than their English counterparts.  Opponents in both 
jurisdictions sought instead a number of amendments, such as to confer a right of 
conscientious objection to district registrars, a right of school teachers to teach that 
same-sex marriage is wrong, a right of service providers to discriminate between 
opposite-sex and same-sex marriage, and a specific statutory provision exempting 
expressions of opposition to same-sex marriage from the hate crime legislation.  In 
Scotland, unlike in England, all of these amendments failed and the only concession 
made to religious sensitivities was that any religious or belief body that wishes to 
provide civil partnership celebrants or marriage celebrants for same-sex couples 
must seek authorisation to do so; and there is an explicit statutory statement that no 
religious or belief body is obliged to seek any such authorisation.26  The Equality Act 
2010 already provides religious bodies with a right to refuse to offer public services 
in a non-discriminatory fashion, but the protections for individuals are necessarily 
different and an additional protection is provided by an amendment by the UK 
Parliament to the 2010 Act (which is reserved to Westminster), allowing any 
individual member of a religious or belief organisation that has sought prescription as 
a body empowered to register civil partnerships (or solemnise same-sex marriages) 
to refuse as an individual to do that which his or her body permits³7he challenge 
for human rights law «>LV] to allow the religious individual to participate to the 
greatest extent possible in public life, while ensuring that particular manifestations of 
their religious beliefs do not have the effecW RI LPSRVLQJ WKHLU EHOLHIV RQ RWKHUV´ 
(Wintemute, 2014, 224). It is unlikely that the amendments to the 2010 Act fully meet 
that challenge.  Though described as a conscience clause, it is to be noted that this 
protection of conscience works only in one direction and any person who belongs to 
a body that disapproves of same-sex relationships cannot be authorised as a 
celebrant even when he or she, as an individual, welcomes as a matter of 
conscience same-sex relationship recognition. 
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It is not just the church minister who can claim a conscientious objection, but anyone 
who might otherwise be expected to be involved in the solemnities of the occasion, 
such as the organist or choirmaster ± though the right does not extend to those 
involved in the celebratory elements, such as the chauffeur or the hotel waiter whose 
employers have contracted to provide such services to a same-sex couple.  Exactly 
where to draw the line between solemnisation and celebration will not always be 
clear, and it is not out of the question that the courts will interpret the exemption 
expansively.27  The conscientious objection need not be shown to be based on any 
RIILFLDO UHOLJLRXV GRFWULQH LW LV WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VHOI-defined belief that is protected, 
irrespective of its basis.  This is a major widening of existing exemptions from the 
UHTXLUHPHQWVLQWKH(TXDOLW\$FWDVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
in Bull v Hall,28 where Lady Hale pointed out that the 2010 Act exemptions (then 
applicable) were deliberately restricted to institutions protecting their own doctrinal 
positions, and that this represented a carefully calibrated balance between the 
equality imperative and the need to give some recognition to religiously-traced 
requirements to discriminate.29  The amendments to the 2010 Act necessitated by 
the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 to allow opposing members 
of supporting churches to continue to discriminate for their own self-defined reasons 
threatens to disrupt that carefully-struck balance. 
The posLWLRQ RI WKH .LUN LQ 6FRWODQG 6FRWODQG¶V ³QDWLRQDO FKXUFK´ LV YHU\ GLIIHUHQW
from the position of the Established Church of England in England and there was no 
need to make any special provision for the Kirk which is, therefore, as open as any 
other religious organisation to decide that it will, in future, offer marriage services to 
same-sex couples.  It is interesting to note that, in its response to the Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V FRQVXOWDWLRQRQ WKH %LOO WKH&KXUFK RI 6FRWODQG ZKLOH RSSRVLQJ WKH 
opening of marriage to same-sex couples on doctrinal grounds, nevertheless 
explained the process by which its doctrines on the matter could be changed 
(Church of Scotland, 2011, [6]-[8]).  This was very different from the doctrinal 
objections of the Church of England, which founded on the definitional argument that 
it is not open to a legislature to change the nature of church doctrine (Church of 
England, 2012, [8]), and reflects the membership-led governance of the Kirk: as Kirk 
membership changes its views, so too does church doctrine.  (This approach is 
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found with other non-hierarchical denominations, such as the Scottish Methodists, 
who similarly contemplated that its membership might change its current opposition 
to same-sex marriage).  Nor was there any need to exempt members of the clergy of 
the national church from the obligation to solemnise marriages30 because in Scotland 
there is no such obligation.  The Kirk¶Vopposition to same-sex marriage reflected its 
earlier opposition to civil partnership, though it is noticeable that its response to the 
marriage consultation expressed opposition only to religious civil partnership.  In 
2009 the Kirk established a Special Commission to determine whether being in a 
civil partnership was compatible with the ministry; this Commission reported in 
2011,31 recommending a further two year period of reflection, and the General 
Assembly in 2013 voted in favour of allowing the training and ordination of civil 
partners (that is to say, of gay and lesbian people).32  A gradual accommodation of 
same-sex relationships seems to be the route that the Kirk is on. 
 
The Future of Civil Partnership 
From 2014, therefore, there are two institutions in Scotland, marriage and civil 
partnership, both available to same-sex couples, though only marriage is available to 
opposite-sex couples.  This position is surely unsustainable, giving as it does more 
options to the former than to the latter.  Both the UK Government and the Scottish 
Government have recognised this unsustainability.  The Scottish legislation does not 
contain, as the equivalent English legislation does,33 a statutory obligation to review 
the continued operation of civil partnership, but the Scottish Government announced 
before the 2014 Act was passed that such a review would nevertheless take place.  
It is likely that there are two primary models for the future, which might be called the 
Dutch model and the Scandinavian model.  The former, which seems to be the 
preferred option of the main LGBT campaigning group in Scotland (the Equality 
Network), would involve maintaining both marriage and civil partnership, but opening 
civil partnership to opposite-sex couples.34  The latter option would involve closing 
civil partnership registrations for the future while retaining existing civil partnerships 
until such time as they naturally die out. 
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Each option has some attractions, but the Dutch model has far more serious 
disadvantages than the Scandinavian model.  Choice is of course a good thing, but 
four different means for UHJLVWHULQJ RQH¶V UHODWLRQship with the state smacks of 
overindulgence.  In any case, and more substantively, choice is valid and real only if 
there is a practical difference in the options available.  Given that marriage for same-
sex couples is now to be virtually identical in its consequences to civil partnership, 
any choice between these two separate institutions (even when open to all) is 
illusory.  A choice only of a name ± ³marriage´ or ³civil partnership´ ± is a choice 
without substance. 
A more practical objection to the Dutch model is that it is not efficient law reform to 
have two institutions doing the job of one.  At the moment we require two sets of 
legislation, two sets of forms to be designed, two sets of approvals of celebrants, two 
sets of opt-ins, two registers of (non-registrar) celebrants: mistakes will inevitably be 
made, as we in Scotland have already seen with the expedited divorce provisions, 
mentioned above.  Any amendment of the law will require twice the effort in 
legislative drafting than if we had only one institution doing one job: there are costs 
involved in this even without the risk of error. 
The reviews of civil partnership that are taking place as this chapter is being written 
might well come to different conclusions, leading to intriguing possibilities of 
registered relationships having a different range of consequences depending upon 
whether they were registered in Scotland or in England.  The fear of the inevitable 
complexities that would give rise to was decisive in the original decision to allow 
Westminster to extend its Civil Partnership Act 2004 to Scotland.  The present, 
independence-seeking Nationalist, Scottish Government is more sanguine about 
such complexities, seeing them as the unavoidable consequence of the 
devolutionary settlement.  That settlement is unlikely to survive in its present form 
much beyond 2014 ± irrespective of the outcome of the Independence Referendum 
due in September 2014 ± and so there is no guarantee that the Scots, faced with the 
question of keeping or abolishing civil partnership, will do as they did in 2004 and 
simply follow the English lead. 
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If it is accepted that only one institution is necessary, then (for reasons of 
international recognition if no other) that institution must be marriage.  The best 
approach would be to build upon the attractive aspects of civil partnership and use 
that institution ± as originally designed ± as a model from which to effect 
improvements in the law of marriage (letting civil partnership itself gradually wither).  
This process has already started: the removal of the sexist reset rule came about 
when it was realised that not only could it not be applied to same-sex couples but 
that, in truth, there was no good reason to keep it for opposite-sex couples either.  
The limitation of impotency to annulments of opposite-sex marriages might well 
prove so anomalous that it is finally scrapped for all marriages ± and the exclusion of 
all sexual considerations from civil partnership continues to provide a role model that 
marriage must, surely, adopt eventually.  Cohabitation is now defined in terms of its 
similarity to marriage and no longer to either marriage or civil partnership.  The 
influence was in the other direction with the unfortunate imposition on civil 
partnership of the marriage rules relating to religious involvement, but that may 
simply be the price that needs to be paid to ensure parity between the two 
institutions.  The anomaly would, in any case, be very short lived if the Dutch 
approach were rejected and the Scandinavian embraced.  Civil partnership would be 
an institution that, having acted as a bridge to the ultimate goal of gender-neutral 
marriage, had served its function and could now be dispatched to an honourable 
place in history. 
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